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nly in recent years have I wondered about the future of the law 
reviews. 
Just a few years ago I was Editor in Chief of this law review, so I 
believe in what they have to offer. During law school, I believed that 
law reviews existed to provide a space for inquiry, discussion, 
discourse, and disagreement, and that law reviews provided a place to 
uncover the intricacies in the law that practicing lawyers don’t have 
the time to uncover themselves before, during, or after a trial. Law 
review articles are made available to attorneys, judges, and other 
authors, who, together, can vet ideas, test the limits of those ideas, 
and help the ones that make sense become standards for American 
governance into both practice and formal law. In law school, we 
associated law review work with journal volumes containing seventy-
five-page articles, often seeming esoteric and out of touch. We joined 
the law review and edited the articles to get clerkships, regardless 
how difficult it was to see their relevance. 
In practice, however, law reviews tend to fill another space. Now, 
as a young practicing attorney, I still struggle to find the articles that 
 
* Nadia Dahab is an attorney practicing trial and appellate litigation in Portland, 
Oregon. She currently serves as a member and cochair of the Amicus Committee for the 
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association. Nadia graduated from the University of Oregon School 
of Law in 2012. 
O
DAHAB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018  1:07 PM 
622 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 621 
tell me, in a succinct way, what I should do to protect a client from 
physician-patient privilege? Or the article explaining whom I should 
name as defendants to ensure not only a favorable judgment, but also 
one on which I can collect? Or the article telling me how to stabilize 
the cyclical nature of the insurance industry? And whether or not 
comprehensive tort reform legislation will serve the ends it’s intended 
to? Most importantly, though, I want a source to explain, without 
forcing me to wade through the state of English common law during 
the Founding era, whether an individual will be compensated for the 
injuries she suffered that are more difficult to calculate, such as 
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium to her 
loved ones. 
As it turns out, such articles are harder to find in law reviews, but 
that doesn’t mean law reviews are irrelevant to my practice. Indeed, 
participating in this symposium revealed quite the contrary; it proved 
to me, at least, that law reviews made, and continue to make, a huge 
difference in the state of a law, especially an area that’s very 
important to me—the Oregon Constitution. 
Law reviews, as it turns out, for decades have been fleshing out the 
issues that this symposium covers. Since the Oregon legislature 
passed its comprehensive tort reform bill in the summer of 1987, law 
reviews have been the primary forum for an important and substantive 
discussion about whether and how Oregon’s Constitution limits the 
scope of the tort reform bill. The law review articles vetted, tested the 
limits of, and packaged ideas for our courts and legislators to consider 
and, in many cases, adopt. Indeed, many of those law review articles 
are part of the reason we’re here today. 
But that is not the point of this Article. The point of this Article 
actually is fairly straightforward—to examine how tort reform 
happened in Oregon. This Article will take us back to the early part of 
1986, when the cyclical nature of the insurance industry was starting 
to take a toll on both Oregon and the rest of the country. At the time, 
insured individuals and entities were in a tough spot; insurance 
companies were either raising rates for, declining to renew, or 
canceling outright, many types of insurance policies. Nationwide, 
individuals, small businesses, and local and state governments simply 
could not find the insurance they needed to operate. The insurance 
companies placed the blame on the civil justice system. 
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I 
THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF THE 1980S 
In the mid-1980s, the insurance industry was going through a crisis 
regarding both the affordability and availability of liability insurance. 
Times were tough, as insurance premiums skyrocketed across the 
country and throughout many sectors of the American economy.1 
Coverage was no longer affordable for many products and services, 
and some insurers refused altogether to offer coverage at any 
premium level.2 In some sectors, insureds became unable to buy as 
much insurance as they needed, which proved to be especially true for 
providers of products or services with a significant amount of excess 
insurance coverage or higher limits policies.3 As mentioned above, 
the crisis was not only of affordability, but also of adequacy and 
availability.4 
At the state and national level, working groups and task forces 
were formed to study the cause and extent of, as well as potential 
solutions to, this crisis. In February 1986, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General, formed an 
interagency Tort Policy Working Group tasked with “examin[ing] the 
rapidly expanding crisis in liability insurance availability and 
affordability” and to recommend potential reforms.5 Similar task 
forces were convened across the states; industry groups, including the 
American Bar Association, also studied the issues.6 
The results from the studies identified a number of potential causes 
for the crisis, some of which were taken more seriously than others. 
Many of the potential causes focused on the insurance industry 
itself—either the economic decisions and actions of industry 
participants or the state laws under which the industry was regulated.7 
 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE 
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE 
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 6–7 (1986). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 15. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO 
IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (1987). 
7 See also id. at 3 (“[A]nalysis of the need for tort reform is complicated by the fact that 
the business practices of the liability insurance industry reflect a wide range of economic 
factors in addition to the performance of the tort system.”); id. (“[C]ritics of the insurance 
industry contend that tight regulation of industry competition and insurers’ ratemaking 
practices is the only way to bring the costs of lability insurance under control.”). 
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Other causes, however, focused on the civil justice system and the 
expansion of tort law in the years preceding the crisis. Industry 
participants, in particular, blamed the issues of affordability and 
availability of insurance on recent increases in frivolous tort lawsuits, 
high litigation costs, and dramatic increases in the sizes of jury 
verdicts.8 As one study explained, 
when critics point out that tort doctrine has steadily evolved towards 
a more expansive system of compensation, they are clearly correct   
. . . . Traditional immunities to tort liability have been abolished, 
doctrinal bars to recovery of emotional distress and economic loss 
have been lifted, absolute defenses (such as contributory 
negligence) have been qualified, and entire areas of injury-
generating activity, such as defective products and medical 
malpractice, have experienced major doctrinal change.9 
And so began what we now know as the tort reform movement of 
the 1980s. Across the United States, state legislatures began to draft 
comprehensive legislation aimed at rolling back, or at least curtailing, 
the expansive scope of compensation that tort law afforded to 
insureds. State legislatures set out to abolish the collateral source rule, 
place limits on a plaintiff’s ability to seek or be awarded punitive 
damages, and create statutory caps on awards of noneconomic 
damages, among many other reforms. 
The tort reform movement in Oregon mirrors that of many other 
states. Early inquiries into the causes of, and potential solutions to, the 
insurance crisis were documented by various independent groups—
the most notable of which was a task force formed by then-Governor 
Viktor Atiyeh.10 Although the official report and recommendations 
formulated by that task force were not considered by the legislative 
task force convened the following year, many of the ideas were 
considered and, in some cases, implemented. 
II 
GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE OF 1986 
In January 1986, while the national insurance crisis played out in 
the background, Governor Atiyeh appointed nineteen individuals—all 
 
8 Id. (“Those concerned about the performance of the tort system argue that large legal 
fees and other administrative costs, sharp rises in the magnitude of tort claims, and the 
unpredictable nature of the system, require drastic revisions in tort law.”). 
9 Id. at 4. 
10 GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON LIAB., FINAL REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
EASE THE LIABILITY INSURANCE STRAIN IN OREGON (1986) [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S 
TASK FORCE]. 
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members of insurance, legal, medical, science, or business 
industries—to what was termed the “Task Force on Liability 
Insurance.”11 Notably, no legislators were on the Governor’s Task 
Force.12 The Executive Order establishing the Task Force directed it 
to study and provide recommendations to: 
• [d]etermine a means of controlling the cost of liability coverage 
for businesses, professional persons and other citizens; 
• [d]etermine a means of assuring availability of such liability 
coverage; [and] 
• [d]etermine a means of reducing the cost of insuring, while 
assuring that legitimate claimants are compensated fairly and 
equitably.13 
After a series of work sessions, the Governor’s Task Force issued 
the report and recommendations.14 The report explained that the 
Governor’s Task Force “undertook examination of the liability 
insurance problem with the resolve that the legal profession, the 
insurance profession, and the private sector equally shared in the 
responsibility of providing effective solutions to ease the liability 
insurance strain on Oregonians.”15 The recommendation identified 
one primary problem contributing to rate hikes for insurance 
premiums as “[h]igh awards for non-economic (pain and suffering) 
damages.”16 It explained: 
Under the present system, juries have unlimited discretion in 
awarding damages for “pain and suffering.” These awards are 
classified as non-economic and are intended to compensate the 
victim for mental, physical, or emotional distress related to an 
injury. However, as noted in case examples, such an award can 
more often reflect a jury’s “sympathy” for the victim rather than its 
actual evaluation of the “loss.” This has resulted in volatile and 
unpredictable awards that directly affect the cost and availability of 
liability insurance.17 
As a potential solution, the Governor’s Task Force proposed to 
“[l]imit awards for non-economic (pain and suffering) damages,” 
 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 1–2. It’s notable, indeed, that the Governor’s Task Force did not involve 
any members of the Oregon legislature, representatives from sections of the bar, or other 
representatives outside of the insurance and small business industries. 
13 Id. at 1. 
14 See generally id. 
15 Id. at 2. 
16 Id. at 4. 
17 Id. 
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noting that “[n]on-economic damages are those subjective injuries 
suffered as a result of bodily injury, death, loss of consortium, loss of 
care, comfort, companionship or society and interference with a 
person’s usual day-to-day activities apart from gainful 
employment.”18 The Task Force proposed “[t]hat in any civil action 
seeking damages arising out of bodily injury, including emotional 
injury or distress, death, loss of care, comfort, companionship and 
society and loss of consortium, non-economic damages shall not 
exceed $100,000 in the aggregate for all plaintiffs.”19 
However, noneconomic damage awards were not the only problem 
the Governor’s Task Force identified. It also identified a number of 
other problems—both with the civil justice system and the insurance 
industry—that it believed were contributing to the insurance crisis.20 
Those included: 
Areas for Reform in the Civil Justice System: 
• Problem: Large “lump sum” payments to victims 
 Solution: Develop a system to allow periodic payment of 
damages. 
• Problem: Joint and several liability 
 Solution: Abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability. 
• Problem: Abuse of the application of punitive damages 
Solution: Eliminate punitive damages from civil action except 
where permitted by statute. 
• Problem: Abuse of the contingency fee system by attorneys 
Solution: Limit attorney contingency fees to certain 
percentages. 
• Problem: The collateral source rule 
Solution: Repeal the collateral source rule in a manner that 
requires offsets for all nonreimbursable collateral 
benefits against damages awards. 
• Problem: Frivolous lawsuits 




18 Id. at 4. 
19 Id. at 5. 
20 Id. at 5–19. 
DAHAB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018  1:07 PM 
2018] Oregon’s History on Caps and the Outlook After Horton 627 
• Problem: The absence of a mechanism for a plaintiff to 
determine the “technical” merits of his or her case 
before filing a claim 
Solution: Require affidavits of qualified experts to be filed 
with the complaint. 
• Problem: The physician-patient privilege 
 Solution: Require waiver of the privilege within ninety days of 
filing a civil complaint in order to present evidence 
of physical injury or damages. 
• Problem: The availability of recovery to those injured in the 
course of committing a felony 
 Solution:  Prohibit individuals from recovering for injuries 
sustained during the commission of a felony. 
• Problem: The unavailability and unaffordability of D&O 
insurance for charitable and non-profit organizations 
 Solution: Limit the liability of directors and officers for 
charitable and non-profit organizations. 
• Problem:  Product liability 
Solution:  Study and “vigorously suppor[t]” national proposal 
to limit liability for product defects.21 
Areas for Reform in the Insurance Industry: 
• Problem: Lack of competition 
Solution: Adopt a temporary rule calling for prior approval of 
rate filings showing a deviation of more than 
twenty-five percent. 
• Problem: Unavailability of coverage 
 Solution: Take initial steps to inaugurate a voluntary Market 
Assistance Plan (MAP) to establish availability of 
insurance for citizens, businesses, and local 
governments. 
• Problem: Insufficient funding and staff to the State’s 
Insurance Division to conduct compliance reviews 
of rate filings 
 Solution: Allocate additional resources to the Insurance 
Division and streamline the rate review and filing 
process. 
 
21 Id. at 5–15. 
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• Problem: Insurance Commissioner lacks authority to initiate 
immediate actions against insurance companies 
acting in violation of state law 
 Solution: Enact legislation providing such authority to the 
Commissioner. 
• Problem: Use of investment income in rate structuring 
 Solution:  Disclosure by insurance companies using 
investment income as a factor in pricing.22 
Ultimately, the Oregon legislature considered problems related to 
those identified by the Governor’s Task Force, but those 
recommendations were never submitted to the legislature for full 
consideration. Instead, the Oregon legislature convened its own 
legislative task force on liability insurance, which took on a similar 
scope of work. 
III 
THE JOINT INTERIM LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE OF 1987 
In January 1987, the Joint Interim Task Force on Liability 
Insurance issued a final action report, which was then submitted to the 
legislature’s Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration.23 Its 
recommendations, while similar to those of the Governor’s Task 
Force, differed in the following ways: 
• Caps on Damages: The Joint Interim Task Force proposed a 
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages with an exclusion for 
cases of serious physical impairment and serious disfigurement. 
• Joint and Several Liability: Rather than abolish the doctrine 
entirely, the Joint Interim Task Force proposed to limit joint 
liability by making defendants who are less than twenty percent 
liable not responsible for other solvent defendants’ shares of the 
judgment. 
• Punitive Damages: The Joint Interim Task Force recommended 
making punitive damages uninsurable as a matter of public 
policy; requiring half of any punitive damages award to go to 
 
22 Id. at 15–19. 
23 See JOINT INTERIM TASK FORCE ON LIABILITY INSURANCE, FINAL ACTIONS TAKEN: 
TORT ISSUES (1987). Members of Joint Interim Task Force were Senator Mike Thorne 
(Cochair), Representative Bob Shiprack (Cochair), Senators Bill Frye and Tony Meeker, 
Representatives Stan Bunn, Darlene Hooley, and Dick Springer, as well as Phil Bogue, 
Wendell E. Gronso, Joan Mazo, Don McClave, Roy Skoglund, M.D., and Dominick Vetri. 
Id. at 1. 
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the state general fund or other public entity; placing a twenty-
five percent limit on attorney contingency fees for punitive 
damages awards; requiring a plaintiff to make a case for 
punitive damages before evidence of the defendant’s net worth 
could be introduced at trial; and requiring clear and convincing 
evidence of malice or wanton and reckless disregard of the 
health, safety, and welfare of others. 
• Collateral Source Rule: Requiring that collateral sources be 
used to reduce the judgment except with respect to life 
insurance, privately purchased insurance policies, retirement or 
pension plan benefits, or any payment the plaintiff is obligated 
to repay. 
• Immunity for Directors and Officers: Adopting a Delaware 
statute that allows shareholders of for-profit corporations to 
immunize their directors for ordinary negligence under the 
business judgment rule. 
• Cap on Attorneys’ Fees: The Joint Interim Task Force 
recommended not capping attorneys’ fees in contingent-fee 
arrangements, leaving in place the one-third cap on contingent 
fees in medical malpractice cases. 
• Period Payments of Damages Awards: The Joint Interim Task 
Force rejected this proposal. 
• Frivolous Lawsuits: The Joint Interim Task Force 
recommended adopting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 
which would allow courts to impose costs, attorneys’ fees, or 
other expenses against an attorney (personally) for filing a 
frivolous complaint. 
• Mandatory Arbitration: The Joint Interim Task Force 
recommended a mandatory arbitration program for all cases up 
to $25,000. 
• Abolishing Discovery and Motions Practice: the Joint Interim 
Task Force recommended doing away with discovery, third-
party practice, and the use of summary judgments in tort cases. 
It also recommended making sanctions against parties abusing 
discovery motions mandatory.24 
The Joint Interim Legislative Task Force also recommended a 
number of changes to industry regulations and practices, including: 
 
24 Id. at 1–4. 
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• Permitting the Insurance Commissioner to create a Market 
Assistance Plan (MAP) and a Joint Underwriting Association 
(JUA) to assist with assessing the availability of coverage 
throughout the state. 
• Permitting the Board of Architects to establish its own 
insurance fund modeled after the lawyers’ professional liability 
fund. 
• Repeal of a statute prohibiting formation of groups for the 
purposes of purchasing group liability insurance. 
•   Disclosure of profit and loss data by insurance companies to 
the Oregon Insurance Division. 
•  Changes to the report laws for medical malpractice and liquor 
liability claims. 
• A law requiring prior approval of all rates that either increase 
or decrease by more than twenty percent. 
• A law requiring notice and an explanation for the cancellation 
or nonrenewal of both individual policies or entire lines of 
insurance by insurance companies. 
• A law requiring that Oregon insurance rates be set using 
Oregon data whenever such data is available and sufficient. 
• Creation of the Department of Insurance, to replace the 
Insurance Division, and allocation of funds for staff and 
support services. 
• Creation of a board to advise the Insurance Commissioner on 
liability insurance issues. 
• Creation of an interim legislative committee to oversee 
substantive and organizational changes to the Oregon 
Insurance Code.25 
The Joint Interim Task Force recommended a number of other 
changes, including changes to liability for liquor and the regulation of 
certain provisions in construction contracts; to insurance coverage for 
individuals convicted of DUII; and, more generally, to the insurance 
industry, on issues of reporting notice, claims settlement, and unfair 
trade practices.26 
 
25 Id. at 4–5. 
26 Id. at 5–8. 
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IV 
THE NONECONOMIC DAMAGES CAP 
The proposed cap on noneconomic damages that the Joint Interim 
Task Force presented to the legislature, which the legislature 
ultimately adopted, read as follows: 
Except for claims subject to [the Oregon Tort Claims Act] and [the 
Oregon Workers’ Compensation Act], in any civil action seeking 
damages arising out of bodily injury, including emotional injury or 
distress, death or property damages of any one person including 
claims for loss of care, comfort, companionship and society and loss 
of consortium the amount awarded for non-economic damages shall 
not exceed $500,000.27 
The cap did not pass the legislature without question, however. 
Substantial debate in both houses focused on a number of issues, 
including the amount of the cap itself and what portion of damages 
awards would fall within, and thus be subject to, the cap. Witnesses 
testified that the cap would adversely affect settlements and would 
“have a big impact on negotiating for injured people,” because it 
would function as either a target for negotiation—vastly undervaluing 
some claims of injured Oregonians—or it would act as a disincentive 
to settle any case that was worth close to the dollar value of the cap.28 
To some, the cap was perceived as likely to “effectively prevent some 
clients from getting anything at all,” identifying young children and 
women as likely to be the most severely impacted by the legislation 
because both populations potentially lacked any, or at least 
sufficiently, predictable economic future or history.29 And, of course, 
absent any provision making the cap subject to inflation, witnesses 
made clear that “it [would] ge[t] worse every year.”30 Lyle Velure, 
representing the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, explained: 
[T]he cap proposal [is] the ultimate in a regressive tax because it 
puts the heaviest burden on those least able to handle it: the small 
handful of people most seriously injured . . . . [T]his bill is also 
discriminatory toward women, homemakers because they have no 
job from which to predict economic loss. [Mr. Velure] cited a recent 
case he’d handled which, under the terms of this bill, would have 
resulted in a catastrophic loss for the family when a young 
housewife and mother was killed. . . . [The] bill would result in an 
 
27 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710(1) (2015). 
28 Hearing on S.B. 323 and S.B. 324 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary Subcomm. 1, 
64th Leg. 12 (Or. May 5, 1987) (testimony of Charles Burt, Salem attorney). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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increase in premiums because it will significantly raise the cost of 
litigation to both plaintiff and defendant. It has had that effect in 
California and Canada because in almost every case, it becomes a 
battle between experts to prove economic damages. Vocational 
experts, economists, etc., will need to be called in to give their 
varied opinions. This costs a great deal.31 
Even Insurance Commissioner Ted Kulongoski32 could not support 
the cap. In his testimony before the House Committee on Judiciary, 
Commissioner Kulongoski “could not answer” the question posed by 
Representative Dave Dix—whether the cap “would . . . affect 
affordability and availability, and to what degree.”33 The minutes of 
Subcommittee One of the House Judiciary Committee reflect 
Commissioner Kulongoski’s response: 
COMMISSIONER KULONGOSKI said he could not answer that. 
He said this is a very complicated issue that needs to be addressed. 
He felt he had identified the problem. He did not think this was the 
way to resolve the problem; he understood that it was good politics, 
but whether in fact it will have any impact, he does not think it will. 
COMMISSIONER KULONGOSKI said he wished that all the time 
and money that has been spent on the issue of tort reform had been 
spending sitting down and looking at the civil justice system, trying 
to figure out a way for the consumers of this state and this country 
to have the court system available to them at an affordable price and 
in a system that was not so complicated. He felt they were going to 
break the system down the way we are going with it – that needs to 
be addressed. 
COMMISSIONER KULONGOSKI said people are always talking 
about statistics, and California is used as an example – that cases 
there increase so many here or there. But that is making an 
assumption that there was an adequate and proper number filed 
originally as the base. COMMISSIONER KULONGOSKI said he 
just knew, as a practitioner, a citizen, and a consumer, the process is 
too costly, too time consuming, and too complicated. He did not 
think that is the way justice is suppose[d] to be. And he felt it was 
having a very disastrous effect on this country’s development. 
COMMISSIONER KULONGOSKI said he wished there were 
another forum to look at this.34 
 
31 Hearing on S.B. 323 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 64th Leg. 9 (Or. Jan. 29, 
1987) (testimony of Lyle Velure, Oregon Trial Lawyers Association). 
32 Kulongoski later served as an Associate Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court and, 
later, Governor of the State of Oregon. 
33 Hearing on S.B. 323 and S.B. 324 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary Subcomm. 1, 
64th Leg. 20 (Or. Apr. 28, 1987). 
34 Id. at 21. 
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Both houses in the Oregon legislature voted for the cap. It became 
law and went into effect later that year. It contained no provision for a 
cost-of-living adjustment or any adjustment for inflation. Today, the 
noneconomic damages cap remains at $500,000.35 
V 
STATUS OF TORT REFORM SINCE 1987 
Since 1987, law reviews have been airing the latest substantive 
discussion on the impacts, effects, and scope of Oregon’s 
comprehensive tort reform law. Just one year after the noneconomic 
damages cap became law, the Willamette Law Review published an 
article authored by Kathy Graham, then-associate dean and law 
professor at Willamette University College of Law, titled, 1987 
Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Reform or Mere 
Restatement?36 In the article, Professor Graham had the foresight to 
predict most of the issues facing us today—the extent to which 
various provisions of the Oregon Constitution limit the application of 
the cap on noneconomic damages to jury verdicts, the same with 
respect to awards of punitive damages, and the impact that products 
and liquor liability laws have on the availability and affordability of 
liability insurance.37 
In the early 1990s, David Schuman—University of Oregon 
professor and later court of appeals judge—authored an article 
published in the Temple Law Review entitled The Right to a Remedy, 
which detailed the historical origins of Oregon’s remedy clause and 
ways in which similar provisions of other state constitutions have 
been construed.38 On the proverbial heels of Professor Schuman’s 
article came the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Lakin v. Senco 
Products, Inc., which invalidated Oregon’s cap on noneconomic 
damages for the foreseeable future by holding that the cap violated 
the jury trial clause of article I, section 17, of the Oregon 
Constitution.39 Today, under Horton v. Oregon Health & Science 
 
35 See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710 (2015). 
36 Kathy T. Graham, 1987 Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Reform or Mere 
Restatement?, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 283 (1988). 
37 Id. 
38 David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1197 (1992). 
39 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 250, 376 
P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
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University,40 the Oregon Supreme Court rolled back, effectively 
overturning, its holding in Lakin and revived the Oregon 
Constitution’s remedy clause41 as the only substantive protection on 
compensatory damages for injured Oregonians. 
Notwithstanding efforts to change them, the terms of the law have 
stayed the same since it went into effect in 1987. The law’s impact on 
injured Oregonians, however, has changed significantly over the 
years. Cases have made their way through the courts and the courts 
have considered, adopted, overruled, or departed from new ideas 
relating to the scope of our constitution’s jury trial and remedy 
guarantees. Notably, many of these new ideas were developed in the 
space that law reviews have provided for academic discussion, 
highlighting the importance, even today, of law reviews in the 
practice and development of our state laws. 
Absent future legislative change, we should let that discussion 
continue—let new ideas be vetted, limits tested, and new rules 
elevated to the status law. Allowing that process to continue through 
article publication in law reviews will serve the ends of American 
governance—to compensate those who are injured and to bring 
justice to those whose rights have been infringed. 
 
 
40 Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
41 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
